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Instructors: Prof. Ph.D. Sebastian Faust
Event type:
Seminar
Org-unit: Dept. 20 - Computer Science
Displayed in timetable as:
skrK
Subject:
Crediting for:
Hours per week:
2
Language of instruction:
Englisch
Min. | Max. participants:
- | -
Course Contents:
Cryptographic schemes are classically secure against black-box attacks, where an attacker exploits weaknesses of the underlying cryptographic algorithm. When cryptography is implemented in practice, so-called side-channel attacks are a further threat to their security. Most of cryptography can be broken by side-channel attacks and countless examples illustrate that almost all the devices that are in use today are affected by them. Starting in the late 1990s, when Kocher showed that smart cards can be broken using timing or power analysis attacks, there has been a plethora of different side-channel attacks been discovered. Most recently, examples such as Foreshadow illustrate that even advanced computing machinery is vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
Leakage resilient cryptography is the discipline that formalises these practical attacks in order to use formal methods for demonstrating security against them. In particular, it defines new security models, so-called leakage models, that incorporate side-channel attacks into the classical security models, and design cryptographic schemes that are provable secure within them.
Preconditions:
The seminar is aimed at master students. Basic lecture IT security or basic knowledge in cryptography are recommended, but not mandatory.
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